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UNENUMERATED POWER AND THE RISE OF 
EXECUTIVE PRIMACY 
Cheng-Yi Huang 
Abstract: This article argues that contemporary syndromes of constitutional 
dysfunction do not solely stem from the failures of the controlling executive power. Rather, 
the tendency of chief executives’ appropriation of power is largely due to the fact that the 
institutional logic of executive power makes them do so. To govern, the chief executive 
needs to run the government with power, either political or constitutional. These powers 
are not always enumerated in the constitution, but would still be regarded as constitutional. 
This paper argues that the idea of taming unenumerated executive powers by definite 
constitutional language and text is mostly futile. Drawing from recent cases of 
constitutional controversies in Japan, Taiwan, and Poland, this article suggests that 
unenumerated powers which cannot be checked by constitutional mechanisms are the cause 
of the expansion of executive primacy in constitutional democracies. Following the case 
studies, this article analyzes the nature and problems of unenumerated powers of the 
executive. Building on the taxonomy proposed by Louis Fisher, the article argues that 
unenumerated powers are analogous to the “implied powers” in Fisher’s discussion. It must 
be affiliated with formal constitutional authority, but its scope would spontaneously expand 
if there were no sensible constraints on the use of unenumerated powers. Political actors 
take advantage of the fuzziness of unenumerated powers as a means of expanding their 
power. In democratic systems, the judicial branch is usually called upon to resolve 
boundary issues. As such, populist politicians often seek to control the court immediately 
after taking office, which in order to temper this threat, and ultimately this action 
contributes to the re-emergence of executive primacy.   
Cite as: Cheng-Yi Huang, Unenumerated Power and the Rise of Executive Primacy, 28 
WASH. INT’L L.J. 395 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION: AUXILIARY PRECAUTION AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE 
POWER? 
There are two conceptions of executive power: first, executive power 
should be confined, and second, executive power should flourish.1  The first 
is built on the fear of power being concentrated in the hands of the executive 
                                                        
  Associate Research Professor, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. I would like to thank Professors Yasuo 
Hasebe, Keigo Komamura, Toru Mori, Masahiro Sogabe, George Shishido, Mayu Terada, and Sota Kimura 
for their careful explanation and comments on Prime Minister Abe’s initiatives for constitutional 
amendments in Japan. Justices Stanisław Biernat, Andrzej Wróbel, and Marek Zubik of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal offered insightful information during my field trip to Poland in 2016. Professors Lech 
Garlicki and Mirosław Wyrzykowski provided extremely helpful guidance. Adam Oleksy, Tzung-yuan Lee, 
Fang-yu Liu, and Junkai Chang have contributed invaluably to this article as research assistants. This paper 
was presented in the workshop on the Resurgence of Executive Primacy in the Age of Populism at Academia 
Sinica, June 2018. I thank all the participants’ comments and questions. All errors remain my own. Contact: 
chengyi@sinica.edu.tw  
1  Margit Cohn, Tension and Legality: Towards a Theory of the Executive Branch, 29 CAN. J.L. & 
JURIS. 321, 321 (2016).   
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branch, while the second avoids fragmenting executive power. 2  Both 
approaches are aimed  towards promoting the public welfare, but the way in 
which the executive may achieve this goal differs greatly from one to the other. 
In recent years, there has been growing concern about the expansion of 
executive power in countries across the globe and worries about populist 
politicians maliciously maximizing the power of the executive to advance 
personal political interests and, consequently, paralyze democratic institutions. 
In a democratic polity, debate over the proper role of executive power is 
doomed to be circuitous. On the one hand, voters usually expect political 
candidates to render electoral promises after stepping into office, which 
signifies a potent and capable executive power. On the other, the party who 
lost the election strives to confine the executive power as much as they can, 
since most of the ruling party’s policies go against their agenda and interests. 
Therefore, the use and control of executive power is a tug of war where one 
side seeks to maximize its functionality and the other side endeavors to 
minimize it.   
However, the tension between maximalism and minimalism cannot be 
reduced to merely a conflict between the abuse of power and the rule of law. 
In fact, there is no doctrine in constitutional law or administrative law 
preventing leaders and governments from doing their job. For example, 
Article 2, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides the president the duty 
and power to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 3  In a 
parliamentary system like Japan, its Constitution also bestows powers on the 
Prime Minister to “submits bills, reports on general national affairs and 
foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision over various 
administrative branches.”4 Apparently, presidents and prime ministers enjoy 
constitutional powers to carry out law and policies. The rule of law does not 
require that everything the executive has done should have been expressly 
mentioned in law or delegated by the legislative branch.5  The traditional 
                                                        
2  The representative work of the second school is ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010). The first school is well represented in BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND 
FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010).   
3  U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3. 
4  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 72 (Japan).   
5  This is best illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Chevron v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Justice Stevens wrote for the court, “When a court reviews an agency's 
construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
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doctrine of ultra vires essentially demands the government rule with 
legitimacy and, therefore, combines the elements of legitimacy with legality.6 
In everyday administration, discretion and deliberation are common features 
of modern government, which requires dialogic interaction among different 
constitutional branches. 7  Checks and balances, therefore, mean that 
democracy should be guarded with the spirit of vigilance rather than the 
specter of abhorrence. In Federalist Paper No. 51, James Madison wrote:  
In framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, 
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught 
man-kind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.8 
Therefore, to attribute the rise of “executive tyranny” or “imperial presidency” 
to the maximalist conception of executive power is a misunderstanding, which 
confuses democratic foundation of modern government with rule-bound 
government.9  
                                                        
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.” Id. at 842–43. Meanwhile, Adrian Vermeule, an administrative law professor at 
Harvard, also noted, “The internal legal argument is that the power to fill in the details is an indispensable 
element of what ‘executive’ power means; that to execute a law inevitably entails giving it additional 
specification, in the course of applying it to real problems and cases. General legislative lawmaking can never 
go all the way down, as it were, to the actual facts of particular cases.” See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S 
ABNEGATION 53 (2016).  
6  According to Trevor R. S. Allan, although A.V. Dicey’s formulation of ultra vires doctrine seems 
to create a tension between legislative supremacy and the rule of law, Dicey also claimed that “Powers, 
however extraordinary, which are conferred or sanctioned by statute, are never really unlimited, for they are 
confined by the words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the interpretation put upon the statute by the 
judges.” T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW 13–14 (2001). 
Therefore, ultra vires actually combines both “legitimacy” (parliamentary sovereignty) and legality (the rule 
of law or the internal morality of law). See id. at 201. In the same vein, Sir John Laws once noted, “the rule 
of law is a necessary condition for the exercise of democratic power since, without it, democracy’s own 
dictates, which must include the decision-maker’s loyalty to the statute which is the democratic source of his 
authority, are sand not stone.” See Sir John Law, Wednesbury, in THE GOLDEN METWAND AND THE CROOKED 
CORD 183, 195 (Christopher Forsyth & Ivan Hare eds., 1998).  
7  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 191 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1992).  
8  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 (James Madison), (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2012).  
9  Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule use the emergency power to illustrate a marginalist conception of 
executive power. According to them, there is no point of Pareto efficiency on the curve of the security-liberty 
tradeoff. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS (2007). 
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Nevertheless, some scholars argue that presidents’ direct control of 
bureaucracy undermines the stability of constitutional democracy. 10  Some 
indicate that the majority party’s court-packing strategy paves the way for 
“dismantling constitutional checks on arbitrary power.”11 Some have even 
coined a new term, “constitutional hardball,” as the cause of constitutional rot, 
which describes the tactic of politicians stretching or defying conventional 
political practices or unspoken rules of politics in order to derogate the health 
of the constitutional system.12  Under this framework, the executive again 
becomes the focus of discussions regarding constitutional dysfunction. 
However, this time it is not related to institutional choice like parliamentary 
or presidential systems during the third wave democratization almost thirty 
years ago.13 At that time, prominent political scientists like Juan Linz claimed 
that presidentialism is prone to corruption and unstable politics.14 However, 
more and more studies have shown that the difference between 
parliamentarism and presidentialism is not a key factor in the collapse of 
democracy.15 Parliamentary systems like that of Poland or Hungary have also 
fallen prey to authoritarian resurgence.16    
                                                        
10  Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 78, 148 
(2018). This follows the almost thirty-years debates over unitary executive power in the United States. See 
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1992); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the 
Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313 (2010).  
11  Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist 
Backsliding (Sydney Law School, Research Paper No. 17, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3103491. 
12  Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004). See also Jack 
M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 101, 
106–10 (Graber, Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018) (Balkin argues, “[b]y playing too much hardball, 
enhancing political polarization, demonizing their opposition, and attempting to crush those who stand in 
their way, political actors risk increasing and widening cycles of retribution from their opponents. This may 
lead to deadlock and a political system that is increasingly unable to govern effectively . . . [and] undermining 
or destroying norms of political fair play and using hardball tactics to preempt political competition may 
produce a gradual descent into authoritarian or autocratic politics.”). 
13  JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: 
SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 143 (1996). See also Bruce Ackerman, 
The New Separation of Powers, 103 HARV. L. REV. 633, 638 (2000). 
14  Tom Ginsburg, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Zachary Elkins, Beyond Presidentialism and 
Parliamentarism, 44 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 515, 518 (2013). 
15  See Maciej Bernatt & Michał Ziółkowski, Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 
487 (2019); Gábor Attila Tóth, Breaking the Equilibrium: From Distrust of Representative Government to 
an Authoritarian Executive, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 317 (2019). 
16  See Gabor Halmai, A Coup Against Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Hungary, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 243–256 (Mark A. Graber et al. eds., 2018); Wojciech Sadurski, 
Constitutional Crisis in Poland, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra. 
 
April 2019  Unenumerated Power 399 
 
 This article argues that contemporary syndromes of constitutional 
dysfunction do not solely stem from the failures of the controlling executive 
power. Rather, the tendency of chief executives’ appropriation of power is 
largely due to the fact that the institutional logic of executive power makes 
them do so. To govern, the chief executive needs to run the government with 
power, either political or constitutional. These powers are not always 
enumerated in the constitution but would still be regarded as constitutional. 
Justice Frankfurter first articulated the existence of unenumerated executive 
powers in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
arguing: “[T]he powers of the President are not as particularized as are those 
of Congress. But unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers. The 
separation of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to 
undefined provisions in the frame of our government.”17 Meanwhile, when 
Justice Jackson famously penned the “twilight zone” doctrine in Youngstown, 
he also admitted that, “I have heretofore, and do now, give to the enumerated 
powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, 
practical implications, instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire 
textualism.” 18  This paper argues that the idea of taming unenumerated 
executive powers by definite constitutional language and text is mostly futile. 
Idolatry of separation of powers cannot solve the problems surrounding 
contemporary syndromes of constitutional dysfunction. Many of the 
unenumerated powers are essential to the maintenance of the day-to-day 
operation of government. However, unenumerated powers also create a “grey 
hole” in the political-legal sphere.19 In a nutshell, it helps the executive, but it 
also blurs the line of the executive power.20 Its endless and gradual expansion 
is the real problem of contemporary constitutional crisis. 
                                                        
17  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952). However, Justice Frankfurter 
adopted an approach of judicial minimalism to deal with the unenumerated executive powers. According to 
his opinion, “The issue before us can be met, and therefore should be, without attempting to define the 
President's powers comprehensively. I shall not attempt to delineate what belongs to him by virtue of his 
office beyond the power even of Congress to contract; what authority belongs to him until Congress acts; 
what kind of problems may be dealt with either by the Congress or by the President, or by both, what power 
must be exercised by the Congress and cannot be delegated to the President. It is as unprofitable to lump 
together in an undiscriminating hodgepodge past presidential actions claimed to be derived from occupancy 
of the office as it is to conjure up hypothetical future cases.” Id. at 597 (citation omitted). 
18  Id. at 640. 
19  DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006).  
20  The grey hole created by the unenumerated power is a “necessary evil” for the executive power. On 
the one hand, the constitution cannot provide a full list of executive powers and the executive has to “take 
care” the execution of law. On the other hand, the facts that the executive power cannot be enumerated would 
lead to abuse of powers by the executive in the name of opaqueness or expediency.  
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 Drawing from recent cases of constitutional controversies in Japan, 
Taiwan, and Poland, this article suggests that unenumerated powers which 
cannot be checked by constitutional mechanisms are the cause of the 
expansion of executive primacy in constitutional democracies. By “executive 
primacy,” I mean the leading and dominant role of the executive branch, 
especially the chief executives, either presidents or prime ministers, to control 
the political agenda on policy issues or constitutional interpretation. Chief 
executives gain more power by exercising their unenumerated powers without 
any constitutional breakdown or coup d’état. The expansion of executive 
primacy does not necessarily mean there is a constitutional crisis, but the non-
reviewability of unenumerated powers will gradually cause the power 
structure to become unbalanced in a constitutional system. This article does 
not intend to repeat the age-old debate surrounding separation of powers like 
the differences between formal and functional models, but will focus on how 
the unenumerated powers micromanage the political system and lead to 
constitutional imbalance.  
The unenumerated powers discussed in this article are subordinate to, 
or affiliated with, constitutional authority of the chief executive, which is 
derived from the everyday practice of power.  
Due to the frequent indeterminacy appearing in the decision-making 
process of the executive power, chief executives may act preemptively to 
interpret the constitution and statutes, to control and discipline the 
bureaucracy with non-statutory power, to call intra-branch meetings, to 
employ “shadow warriors,” or even to rule with alibi (whether this puppets-
controlling could be regarded as the exercise of executive power is another 
question). In some cases, unenumerated powers are coupled with party 
machinery. The power of party leadership, combined with constitutional 
authority of chief executives, makes the power system lean even more towards 
executive primacy and expands the scope of unenumerated powers.  
The following section begins with the Japanese Prime Minister’s 
control of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau to advance his interpretation of 
Article 9. Additionally, it also discusses the existence and function of “shadow 
warriors” employed by Prime Ministers in Japan to facilitate major policies. It 
then moves to Taiwan to analyze the Taiwanese President’s institutional 
pendulum between powerlessness and all-powerfulness after the 1997 
constitutional amendments. To render their policies, the presidents in Taiwan 
have to call intra-branch meetings and to assume the position of party 
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chairpersons. These powers are not constitutionally defined and sometimes 
are criticized as unconstitutional. However, it is a rational response to 
institutional plights in Taiwan’s constitutional system. The Polish case 
provides a very different story. Since the return of the Law and Justice party 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereinafter, PiS), its chairperson Jarosław 
Kaczyński has not assumed any position in the government but functions as 
the “Godfather” behind the scenes. Presidents or Prime Ministers have to 
follow his political decisions. His power is extra-constitutional and cannot be 
counteracted through any constitutional mechanism. The party chairperson 
controls the President and Prime Ministers as puppets in his hands. The 
informal chain of control by the party leader represents the murkiest zone of 
unenumerated powers. The chief executive may share the unenumerated 
powers with party leaders like Kaczyński. The outcome appears to be that the 
chairperson is the real political leader with the aid of unenumerated powers 
stemming from the chief executive. The unenumerated powers in Poland may 
be illustrated by the act of falandization, or twisted interpretation, by the 
presidents in Poland. Both syndromes of puppet-masters and twisted 
interpretation, are critical to the Polish constitutional crisis after 2016.  
Following the case studies, this article analyzes the nature and problems 
of unenumerated powers of the executive. Building on the taxonomy proposed 
by Louis Fisher, the article argues that enumerated powers are analogous to 
the “implied powers” in Fisher’s discussion.21 It must be affiliated with formal 
constitutional authority, but its scope would spontaneously expand if there 
were no sensible constraints on the use of unenumerated powers. The problem 
is similar to that of “concept creep” in behavioural science, which is a term 
used to describe a situation when the scope of a concept is fuzzy and the 
boundaries have become blurred. Political actors take advantage of the 
fuzziness of unenumerated powers as a means of expanding their power. In 
democratic systems, the judicial branch is usually called upon to resolve 
boundary issues. As such, populist politicians often seek to control the court 
immediately after taking office, which in order to temper this threat, and 
ultimately this action contributes to the re-emergence of executive primacy.   
II. WAR POWER, BUREAUCRACY AND SHADOW WARRIORS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL BATTLES IN JAPAN 
In the past six years, Japan has been entangled in fierce constitutional 
battles over war power. Since Shinzo Abe assumed the position of Prime 
                                                        
21  LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 70 (2014). 
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Minister in 2012, the amendment of Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution has 
become an urgent issue for the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”).22 As one 
of the most significant constitutional provisions in the post-war Japanese 
Constitution, Article 9, paragraph 1 requires Japan “renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of forces as means of settling 
international disputes.”23 The Renouncement Clause has been a fixture of 
Japan’s pacifist constitutionalism for seventy years. However, since the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and 
Japan of 1960, the interpretation of Article 9 has been surrounded by 
controversy. 24  The existence of Self-Defense Force and the U.S. military 
bases in Japan are remnants of the Cold War era.25 Therefore, the question 
remains of how to reconcile the Renouncement Clause with the practical need 
for  national defense, as well as collaboration with the United States.  Using a 
tactic similar to “court-packing,” the Abe administration took the chance to 
reshuffle the personnel of the Legislation Bureau. The Bureau is the entity 
responsible for interpreting Article 9 for the government, which is then 
binding on the government’s policy. Therefore, if the Bureau’s interpretation 
is realigned with Abe’s policy, the government may advance its own agenda 
of constitutional revision. The progress on constitutional revision has made 
Prime Minister Abe the most powerful leader after WWII and helped his party 
to win elections since 2012. The following sections first examine how he 
made progress on the issue of Article 9 and later discuss his way to control 
bureaucracy in Japan.  
                                                        
22  KIMURA SŌTA (木村草太), JIEI TAI KENPŌ—KORE KARA NO KAIKEN RONGI NO TAME NI (自衛隊
と憲法-これからの改憲論議のために) [SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AND THE CONSTITUTION—FOR THE 
FORTHCOMING CONTROVERSY]54 (2018). 
23  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan). 
24  Nishimura Yūichi (西村裕一 ), Kenpō Kaikaku, Kenpō Hensen, Kaishaku Kaiken―Nippon 
Kenpō Gakusetsushi no Kanten kara (憲法改革・憲法変遷・解釈改憲―日本憲法学説史の観点から) 
[Constitutional Reform, Constitutional Transition, Interpretation and Revision―From the Viewpoint of the 
History of Japanese Constitutional Theory], in ‘KENPŌ KAISEI’ NO HIKAKU SEIJIGAKU (「憲法改正」の比
較政治学) [COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM] 441, 456 (Komamura Keigo (駒村圭吾) 
& Machidori Satoshi (待鳥聡史) eds., 2016).  
25  The United States-Japan military cooperation was formed to deter the expansion of communism 
during the cold war. Therefore, even though Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution requires Japan to 
relinquish war power, the self-defense force was set up to protect Japan as well as to collaborate with the U.S. 
troops. See YOSHIMOTO SADAAKI (吉本真昭), SHIRAREZARU NIPPON-KOKU KENPŌ NO SHŌTAIKENPŌ NO 
SHŌTAI  (知られざる日本国憲法の正体 ) [THE TRUE CHARACTER OF THE UNKNOWN JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTION] 343–69 (2014).  
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A. Constitutional Maneuvering Through Interpretation: The Tale of 
the Legislation Bureau  
Since the 1950s, the Legislation Bureau of the Cabinet has issued a 
series of interpretations setting up a time-honored distinction between “force” 
and “self-defense.” 26  To the legal experts in the Legislation Bureau, the 
existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Force is not in violation of the Constitution 
because Article 13 of the 1947 Constitution also requires the government to 
maintain the Self-Defense Force to secure happiness, or welfare, of the 
Japanese people.27 Therefore, to the extent the welfare and happiness of the 
Japanese are at stake, the Self-Defense Force is necessary for carrying out this 
constitutional mandate. However, Article 9, paragraph 2 provides, “[i]n order 
to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”28 According to the 
Legislation Bureau’s interpretations, paragraph 2 refers to “military force,” 
which does not include the Self-Defense Force. Therefore, the Self-Defense 
Force is within the scope of constitutionally permissible “force.”  
Based on this interpretation, Japanese constitutional scholars have 
identified two categories of self-defense: the first is “individual self-defense 
right” (permissible); while the latter is “collective self-defense right” 
(impermissible).29 Individual self-defense is permissible because it is claimed 
by the Japanese people as a right to pursue happiness, as well as a right to 
protect Japan from foreign attacks. However, if Japan participated in the 
alliance force to attack other countries, then it would go beyond constitutional 
delegation of self-protection and be involved with war power, which is 
                                                        
26  NAKAMURA AKIRA (中村明), SENGO SEIJI NI YURETA KENPŌ KYŪ JŌ―NAIKAKU HŌSEI KYOKU 
NO JISHIN TO TSUYOSA (戦後政治にゆれた憲法九条―内閣法制局の自信と強さ) [POSTWAR POLITICS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION’S ARTICLE 9― CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTH OF THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU] 
9 (2d ed. 2001). 
27  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 13 (Japan) (“All of the people shall be respected 
as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not 
interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental 
affairs.”). 
28  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 2 (Japan).  
29  HASEBE YASUO (長谷部恭男), Anpo Kanren Hōsei o Aratamete Ronzuru (安保関連法制を改め
て論ずる) [Another Discussion on Security-Related Legislation], in ANPO HŌSEI KARA KANGAERU KENPŌ 
TO RIKKEN SHUGI. MINSHU SHUGI  (安保法制から考える憲法と立憲主義・民主主義 ) [THE 
CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY FROM THE VIEW OF SECURITY LAW] 91, 93 (Hasebe 
Yasuo ed., 2016). 
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prohibited by Article 9. 30  Although the line between “individual” and 
“collective” is sometimes hard to draw, the Legislation Bureau has concluded 
three principles of “individual self-defense” since 1972: (1) there is an 
emergent and illegitimate attack on Japan; (2) there are no other suitable 
means to expel the attack and the forces used shall follow the least and 
necessary principle; and (3) it is not permissible to join any alliance to prevent 
the attacks from other countries.31   
Against this backdrop, in July 2014, Prime Minister Abe abruptly 
changed the definition of “individual self-defense force” by passing a new 
resolution in the Cabinet.32 It was a rare case of cabinet politics in Japan, since 
the Prime Minister usually defers to the interpretation of the Legislation 
Bureau. However, there is no statutory prohibition on the Prime Minister’s 
power to reinterpret constitutional provisions. The three new principles 
include: (1) the attacks are targeted on Japan or on countries geographically 
adjacent to Japan, the attacks threaten the existence of Japan, or the attacks 
create immediate danger to destroy the foundation for citizens’ pursuit of life, 
liberty and happiness; (2) there are no other suitable means to expel the attacks, 
to secure Japan as an independent nation, and to protect the citizens; and (3) 
the force used shall follow the least and necessary principle.33 In this new 
formula, principle one expressly deviated from the longstanding interpretation 
held by the Legislation Bureau, which prohibits “collective self-defense.” The 
new interpretation allows Japan to use force when neighboring countries are 
under attack by foreign enemy that is regarded as a threat to Japan.34   
After the change of interpretation, the cabinet proposed a new 
legislation, the Peace and Security Act of 2015 (“PSA”), to allow the Self-
Defense Force to participate in military cooperation with allied forces or U.N. 
troops, though their participation is limited to providing logistic support 
                                                        
30  KIMURA SŌTA (木村草太), SHŪDAN-TEKI JIEI-KEN WA NAZE IKEN NA NO KA (集団的自衛権はな
ぜ違憲なのか) [WHY IS THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?] 17–18 (2018). 
31  HASEBE YASUO (長谷部恭男),  Anpo Hōsei kara Kangaeru SaikōSai to Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku no 
Yakuwari (「安保法制」から考える最高裁と内閣法制局の役割) [THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
AND CABINET LEGISLATIVE BUREAU FROM THE VIEW OF “SECURITY LAW”], in ANPO HŌSEI KARA 
KANGAERU KENPŌ TO RIKKEN SHUGI. MINSHU SHUGI , supra, at 53, 59–61. 
32  Martin Fackler & David E. Sanger, Japan Announces a Military Shift to Thwart China, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/japan-moves-to-permit-greater-use-of-its-
military.html. 
33  SADURSKI, supra note 11, at 61. 
34  KIMURA, supra note 22, at 106. 
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only. 35  Several constitutional scholars had criticized the bill as 
unconstitutional, since it would make collective self-defense an available 
option for the government.36  Nevertheless, the legislation was passed by the 
National Diet in September 2015. The legislative process of PSA also 
engendered the largest public protest against the government since the 1960s.  
The most controversial move by the Abe administration is the change 
in the interpretation of “self-defense.” In fact, when Mr. Abe first became 
Prime Minister in 2006, he demanded the Legislation Bureau to change its 
interpretation but it was rejected by then Director-General of the Legislation 
Bureau, Reiichi Miyazaki.37 When Mr. Abe won the election in 2012, he 
strategically promoted the Director-General of the Legislation Bureau, 
Tsuneyuki Yamamoto, who opposed the change, to the bench of the Supreme 
Court.38 In doing so, Yamamoto cannot prevent Prime Minister Abe from 
reinterpreting Article 9, since the Supreme Court is a collegial body and is 
passive in interpreting this clause. Later on, Prime Minister Abe appointed the 
Ambassador to France, Ichiro Komatsu, as the new Director-General. Under 
the new leadership of Mr. Komatsu, the Bureau has drafted new 
interpretations about the Self-Defense Force, and the Cabinet later approved 
it. 39  Former Director-Generals, including Masahiro Sakata and Judge 
Yamamoto, have spoken out on the media opposing the Abe administration’s 
                                                        
35   The Peace and Security Act of 2015 mainly authorizes the government to use forces in the following 
cases: (1) to protect the life and safety of oversea Japanese; (2) to defend alliance force stationed in Japan so 
as to avoid national emergency and to take legitimate defense; (3) to protect life and safety in the operation 
of peacekeeping with the United Nation; (4) when the surrounding area of Japan is under attack. See KIMURA, 
supra note 22, at 108–14. 
36  Takahashi Kazuyuki (高橋和之), Rikken Shugi ha Seifu ni Yoru Kenpō Kaishaku Henkō o Kinshi 
suru  (立憲主義は政府による憲法解釈変更を禁止する) [Constitutionalism Prohibits the Government 
from Changing Constitutional Interpretation], in SHŪDAN-TEKI JIEI-KEN NO NAN GA MONDAI 
KA―KAISHAKU KAIKEN HIHAN (集団的自衛権の何が問題か―解釈改憲批判) [WHAT IS THE PROBLEM 
WITH COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE?] 183, 195–96 (Okudaira Yasuhiro (奥平康弘) & Yamaguchi Jirō (山口
二郎) eds., 2014); HASEBE, supra note 29, at 98; KIMURA, supra note 29, at 18. 
37  Matsutani Sōichirō (松谷創一郎 ), Wasureppoi Nipponnin no Tame no“Anpo Hōsei ni Itaru 
Michi”―Abe Shinzō Shushō no Mittsu no Senryaku  (忘れっぽい日本人のための“安保法制に至る道”―
安倍晋三首相の３つの戦略) [“THE ROAD TO SECURITY LAW” FOR FORGETFUL JAPANESE: THE THREE 
STRATEGIES OF PRIME MINISTER SHINZO ABE], YAHOO! JAPAN NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015), 
https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/soichiromatsutani/20150915-00049546/. 
38  Jeremy A. Yellen, Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Ambitions, THE DIPLOMAT (June 12, 2014), 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions/. 
39  See KIMURA, supra note 30, at 71–73; Shushō, Kenpō Kaishaku Henkō ‘Kihon wa Kakugi Kettei’ 
Shūdanteki Jieiken Meguri (首相、憲法解釈変更「基本は閣議決定」集団的自衛権巡り) [THE PRIME 
MINISTER CHANGES CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: “BASIC CHANGES ARE CABINET DECISIONS” FOR 
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE PATROLS], NIPPON KEIZAI SHINBUN (日本経済新聞 ) (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS2000F_Q4A220C1EB1000/. 
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change of the long-term interpretation. 40  The successor of Ambassador 
Komatsu, Mr. Yuusuke Yokobatake, continues to uphold the constitutionality 
of collective self-defense right.41  
Prime Minister Abe’s control of the Legislation Bureau is quite a 
showdown between bureaucrats and politicians. It has been a proud tradition 
of Japan that their bureaucrats come from elite colleges and mostly serve for 
life, climbing up the ladder all the way to the top.42 Therefore, bureaucracy 
acts as a check on the power of the cabinet. The politicians come and go but 
the bureaucrats stay for life. The most famous example is the former Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now Ministry of Economic, Trade 
and Industry), which has been praised as the architect for Japan’s economic 
miracle and developmental state.43  
However, Prime Minister Abe’s constitutional reinterpretation of 
Article 9 has proven that the bureaucrats, even prestigious ones like the 
Legislation Bureau who enjoys a reputation of expertise, are no longer free 
from political control. In the past, the General-Director was chosen from the 
line of Vice General-Directors.44 However, Prime Minister Abe intentionally 
appointed an ambassador to the position to meddle in the bureaucratic culture. 
Through this display of muscle, Prime Minister Abe is attempting to show 
bureaucrats who the boss is now.45  
                                                        
40  See Kyodo, Two Former Heads of Legislation Bureau Blast Security Bills, JAPAN TIMES (June 22, 
2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/22/national/politics-diplomacy/two-former-heads-
legislation-bureau-blast-security-bills/#.XDMfXVUzaUk. 
41  See Cabinet Legislation Bureau Chief Defends Self over Process of Reinterpreting Article 9, 
MAINICHI (Mar. 17, 2016), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160317/p2a/00m/0na/014000c. 
42  CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 21–22, 198–241 (1982). 
43  B.C. KOH, JAPAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 252–58 (1989); TSUJI KIYOAKI (辻清明), SHINPAN 
NIHON KANRYOSEI NO KENKYU (新版 日本官僚制の研究) [A NEW STUDY OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY] 
(1969); MURAMATSU MICHIO (村松岐夫), SENGO NIHON NO KANRYOSEI (戦後日本の官僚制) [POSTWAR 
JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY] (1981). 
44 SAKATA MASAHIRO (阪田雅裕), ‘ HŌ NO BANNIN’ NAIKAKU HŌSEI KYOKU NO KYŌJI (「法の番人」 
内閣法制局の矜持) [“THE GUARD OF THE LAW”: THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU’S RESERVATION] 
(2014). 
45  ‘Hō no Bannin’ ni mo Abe Iro Hōsei Kyoku Chōkan ni Komatsu-shi (「法の番人」にも安倍色 
法制局長官に小松氏) [Mr. Komatsu is the Same Color as Abe in “The Guard of the Law”], NIHON KEIZAI 
SHINBUN ( 日 本 経 済 新 聞 ) (Aug. 3, 2013), https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS02047 
_S3A800C1EA2000/. Shimizu Masato (清水真人), Tōchi kikō no henkaku ka hakai ka, Hōsei kyoku jinji no 
shinsō (統治機構の変革か破壊か、法制局人事の深層 ) [Reform or Destruction of the Governance 
System, Deep in the Legislative Personnel Department], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN (日本経済新聞) (Sept. 3, 
2013), https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFK0201Z_S3A900C1000000/. 
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B. Empire-Building Through Personnel Power 
In 2014, the Abe administration created a new office in the cabinet 
secretariat, the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs ( 内閣人事局 , 
Naikakujinjikyoku).46 The Bureau is designed to provide a list of appointees 
for mid-level officials in the government, ranging from the Assistant Secretary 
(審議官, shingikan) or Administrative Vice-Minister (事務次官, jimujikan) 
to the Director (部長, bucho). The establishment of the Bureau represents an 
attempt by the Prime Minister to place the bureaucrats under his or her control. 
For instance, the involvement of the politically appointed State Minister (副
大臣, fukudaijin) in the policymaking process on each level establishes a 
second channel to monitor and to oversee the process of administration.47  
Personnel power is key to Prime Minister Abe’s constitutional battle 
plan, as well as economic reform. 48  By replacing the high-to-mid level 
officials, the Prime Minister has realigned the bureaucratic order with his own 
political will. After reshuffling the bureaucracy, governmental officials are 
less likely to function as safeguards against the personal interests of political 
actors. The potential for promotion, as one of the critical motives for career 
bureaucrats, would make the mid-level officials more vulnerable to Prime 
Minister Abe’s expressed or implicit directives. In fact, this is the culmination 
of political reform after the breakdown of the bubble economy in the 1990s.49 
During the economic downturn in the mid-1990s, political scandals about 
bureaucrats were rampant and bureaucrats lost support and respect from the 
general public. 50  In the wake of economic failure, the Hashimoto 
administration (1996-1998) proposed administrative reform to reshape the 
                                                        
46  Reiji Yoshida, Abe Moves to Boost Control of Bureaucrats, JAPAN TIMES (May 27, 2014), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/27/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-inaugurate-new-office-
exert-control-bureaucrats/. 
47  See Mayu Terada, The Changing Nature of Bureaucracy and Governing Structure in Japan, 28 
WASH. INT’L L.J. 431 (2019). 
48  KARUBE KANSUKE (軽部謙介), KANRYŌ-TACHI NO ABENOMIC: IGYŌ NO KEIZAI SEISAKU WA IKANI 
TSUKURARETA KA (官僚たちのアベノミクス ―異形の経済政策はいかに作られたか ) 
[BUREAUCRACY’S ABENOMICS: HOW THIS UNUSUAL POLICY WAS MADE] (2018). 
49  HARUKATA TAKENAKA (竹中治堅), SHUSHŌ SHIHAI― NIPPON SEIJI NO HENBŌ (首相支配―日本
政治の変貌) [CONTROL OF THE PRIME MINISTER – TRANSFORMATION OF JAPANESE POLITICS] (2006). 
50  See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, Japanese Minister Resigns over Bribery, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 
1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/01/28/japanese-minister-resigns-over-
bribery-scandal/420f3a7c-17b3-4d5d-a1d6-3d7c9f7cef2e/. See also Mary Jordan, Japan Cracks Down on 
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government. When the popular Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-
2006), who had turned the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) inside-out, took 
office, he expedited the advancement of governmental reform. In his most 
ambitious political battle, he successfully privatized the postal service in 
Japan and shook complacent bureaucrats.51     
The governmental reform initiated by Hashimoto had two prongs: first, 
in order to enhance the cabinet’s ability to initiate policy, the Prime Minister 
was given more power to coordinate and direct the policy process; second, as 
a means of improving the quality of policy-making, the Cabinet Secretariat 
created more advisory groups under the Prime Minister. 52  The latter 
significantly expanded the role of special advisors to the Prime Minister; these 
offices are now considered key players within the cabinet. For example, 
during Prime Minister Abe’s second and third terms, one of his five special 
advisors, Hirodo Izumi, was described as his “shadow warrior.”53 Indeed, a 
recent scandal involving the opening of a veterinary school in a special 
location has generated rumors that Mr. Izumi might have received bribery on 
behalf of the Prime Minister or his family member.54  
Controlling personnel power, penetrating the policy process, and 
assigning special advisors as shadow warriors: all of these “reforms” are 
unrelated to the macro function of constitutional structure, but are necessary 
for facilitating “governmental reforms” in Japan. These changes do not 
require any constitutional revision or amendment but still reshapes Japan’s 
bureaucracy-political relationship. They have made the Prime Minister more 
powerful than ever through these unenumerated and facilitative powers, 
which discipline the bureaucracy and cast tacit influence upon the 
policymaking process.  
                                                        
51  The Man Who Remade Japan, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2006), 
https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/09/14/the-man-who-remade-japan. See also Anthony Faiola, Japan 
Approves Postal Privatization, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2005/10/14/AR2005101402163.html. 
52  TAKENAKA, supra note 49, 58–59. 
53  In the news report, Mr. Izumi claimed that his job is to express the will of the Prime Minister, when 
the Prime Minister cannot express himself publicly. ‘Sōri wa Ienai kara Watakushi ga’ to Shushōhosakan 
ga… Zenjikan Shōgen (「総理は言えないから私が」と首相補佐官が…前次官証言) [“Because I 
cannot say the Prime Minister,” said the First Co-Leader… Testimonial of the Assistant Secretary General],  
ASAHI SHINBUN ( 朝 日 新 聞 ) (May 30, 2017), https://www.asahi.com/articles/ 
ASK5Y6FFKK5YUTIL04R.html . 
54  Reiji Yoshida, Breaking Down the Kake Gakuen Scandal: Who’s Lying, Abe or His Political 
Opponents?, JAPAN TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/01/national/politics-
diplomacy/breaking-kake-gakuen-scandal-whos-lying-abe-political-opponents/. 
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The Prime Minister now occupies the center of politics. On the one 
hand, he personifies his electoral support and designates himself as the 
singular representative of the whole nation. On the other hand, he turns the 
electoral mandate to marshal bureaucracy. It might not be an exaggeration to 
say that Prime Minister Abe has fulfilled the dream of generations of Japanese 
politicians.  
In the case of constitutional revision, Prime Minister Abe managed to 
control the personnel of the Legislation Bureau, which allowed him to gain 
the power to redefine Article 9 through the mouth of the chief officer in the 
Legislation Bureau. With this new interpretation in place, further 
constitutional amendment is foreseeable. Though the amendment itself is not 
such an urgent issue among citizens, Prime Minister Abe and the LDP have 
harnessed patriotism and nationalism through this ongoing constitutional 
battle. They have gained popular support by repeating the necessity of 
constitutional reform in recent parliamentary elections.55  
To be clear, the personnel power, policy initiative power, and 
monitoring power are all subordinate and supportive to the Prime Minister’s 
executive power, which is constitutionally ordained. However, these 
unenumerated executive powers are now the vital wheels for the Prime 
Minister to build his empire in Japan’s politics.  
III. COORDINATION GONE WRONG: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWERS IN TAIWAN 
The Constitution of the Republic of China (known as Taiwan) provided 
a parliamentary system where the Premier was the head of the executive 
branch. 56  However, after democratization, the Constitution was amended 
seven times. During its second and third iterations, in 1992 and 1994, the 
governmental system was redesigned as a semi-presidential system with direct 
presidential election nationwide. 57 In its current form, the Premier is more 
like a managing director of the team of the executive, while the President is 
the boss. The institutional logic is that the President won the election and 
                                                        
55  LDP, under the leadership of Mr. Abe, has won general elections for the House of Representatives 
in 2012, 2014, and 2017; it also won the elections of the House of Councilors (Senate) in 2013 and 2016.  
56  MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 53 (1947) (Taiwan) (“the Executive Yuan shall be the highest 
administrative organ of the State”). 
57  See e.g., ROBERT ELGIE, SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: SUB-TYPES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
28–29 (1st ed. 2011). 
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appointed her Premier to be accountable to the Legislative Yuan, as well as 
the President. The Premier is accountable to the Legislative Yuan, in that 
Article 3 of the 1997 Amendment sustained the original constitutional 
language, “[T]he Executive Yuan shall be responsible to the Legislative Yuan,” 
even though the responsibilities of the Executive Yuan had been altered 
greatly.58 Therefore, as of 2006, the Constitutional Court reiterated that the 
Premier is still the chief executive.59 However, the same court also stated in 
another decision in 2007 that, “subject to the scope of his executive powers 
granted by the Constitution and the Amendment to the Constitution, the 
President is the highest executive officer and has the duty to preserve national 
security and national interests.”60  
The Constitutional Court’s decisions did not make Taiwan’s mixed 
system of President-Premier semi-presidentialism more rational and stable. 
Jiunn-rong Yeh, a prominent public law scholar, has argued that “although 
constitutional revisions resulted in direct presidential elections, the 
President’s role and relationship with the Premier and the Legislative Yuan 
remain ambiguous . . . .”61 He pointed out that “[t]he constitutional ambiguity 
surrounding presidential powers only exacerbates the tension [of partisan 
politics].” 62  The tension among different political parties (representing 
divergent national identities) reversely constricts the scope of presidential 
power. In Interpretation No. 520, the newly elected President Chen Shu-bian 
of the longtime opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (“DPP”), 
suspended the construction of the No. 4 Nuclear Power Plant by way of the 
Premier’s cabinet meeting. However, the Court ruled that even though the 
President, with his new mandate, may propose new policies or revise existing 
                                                        
58  MINGUO XIANFA [Constitution] art. 3 (2005) (Tiwan), 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000002. 
59  Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 613 (司法院大法官解釋第 613 號解釋 ) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 613] (July 21, 2006). In this decision, the court responded to the constitutional status of 
independent agency in Taiwan and reasoned that even though it is important to uphold independency, it is 
equally important to emphasize the accountability. The Legislative Yuan cannot deprive the participation of 
the Executive Yuan in appointing members of the National Communication Commission, which is an 
independent agency.    
60  Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 627 (司法院大法官解釋第 627 號解釋 ) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 627] (June 15, 2007) (rationale located in paragraph 10).  
61  JIUNN-RONG YEH, THE CONSTITUTION OF TAIWAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 65 (2016). 
62  Id. 
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policies, the Executive Branch has to work with the Legislative Yuan to make 
the decision jointly, which is the essence of the five-power government.63  
The construction of No. 4 Nuclear Power Plant has been an entangled 
political issue in Taiwan for almost four decades. After President Ma Ying-
jeou won his reelection in 2012, his premier, Mr. Jiang Yi-hua announced 
several options to deal with the nuclear power plant, including referendum 
and immediate termination. However, the Legislative Yuan majority, which 
also belonged to the same party as President Ma, disagreed with either 
referendum or immediate termination. President Ma could not control the 
Legislative Yuan, even though he was also the chairperson of their shared 
party, Kuomingtang (the Chinese National Party, “KMT”). This is the 
backdrop of the following episode, which was a showdown between the 
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and the President, both of whom are members 
of the KMT.64 
A. Presidential Control of the Legislative Branch: Party Discipline 
and the Prosecutorial Power 
In September 2013, less than a year before the massive protest of the 
Sunflower Movement, a constitutional dispute arose between the President 
and the Legislative Yuan’s Speaker. The constitutional controversy stemmed 
from a report sent from the Attorney General to the President.65 On August 
31, 2013, the Attorney General, Mr. Shi-ming Huang, found that the Speaker 
of the Legislative Yuan, Mr. Jing-pyng Wang, had called the Minister of 
Justice and the chief prosecutor at the High Court to lobby for a criminal case 
which involved the caucus whip of the opposition party, Mr. Chien-ming Ker, 
who was also the Speaker’s good friend.66 The Attorney General received this 
information through wiretapping. Upon learning this information, he went 
                                                        
63  Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 520 (司法院大法官解釋第 520 號解釋 ) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 520] (Jan. 15, 2001); Hsu Tzong-Li(許宗力), Yingjie Lifaguo De Daolai ？！－Ping Shizi 
Di 520 Hao Jieshi(迎接立法國的到來？！－評釋字第五二○號解釋) [Welcome the Arrival of the 
Legislative State?!－Commentary on the Fifth and Second Interpretation], in FA YU GUOJIA QUANLI (2) (法
與國家權力(二)) [2 LAW AND STATE POWER] 383, 385–86 (2007). In terms of Five-Power Government, see 
YEH, supra note 61, at 52–57.  
64  See YEH, supra note 61, at 67–68, 175–77.  
65  Lawrence Chung, Ma Ying-jeou Drops Appeal, Allowing Speaker Wang Jin-pyng to Keep role, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 6, 2013), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1325475/ma-ying-
jeou-drops-appeal-allowing-speaker-wang-jin-pyng-keep-role. 
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directly to the president’s office to report the scandal; the President requested 
that he provide a briefing of the case to the Premier. Meanwhile, President Ma 
also summoned the Premier to his residence that same night and told him 
about the case. About one week after the initial report, the Attorney General 
held a press conference to disclose the case to the whole nation. Two days 
later, the President held another press conference in his capacity as the KMT 
chairperson to revoke Speaker Wang’s membership within the KMT.67 The 
Speaker would have lost his seat in the parliament if the revocation were valid, 
since the Speaker was elected through the track of proportional representation, 
which requires that the Speaker first be a member of the KMT. 68  Some 
conspiracy theories suggest that President Ma was upset by the Speaker’s 
prolonged handling of China-Taiwan trade agreement and wanted someone to 
take over his job. However, because Taiwan has adopted the semi-presidential 
system, the President has no power to “fire” the Speaker in any way. Therefore, 
by way of party disciplinary procedure, President Ma found a channel through 
which he could substantially control the Speaker. 
After this unprecedented development, the Speaker immediately filed 
an injunction in court to safeguard his membership and later sued the KMT. 
He won the civil case on his party membership based on procedural grounds.69 
Mr. Chien-ming Ker also sued the Attorney General and President Ma, 
claiming that they had violated the Communication Security and Surveillance 
Act (“Wiretapping Act”), which prohibits government officers from 
disclosing wiretapped information absent a legitimate reason. Mr. Ker 
claimed that neither the Attorney General nor the President should have 
released the information at a press conference or passed the unlawful 
information on to the Premier. He won the case against the Attorney General 
but lost the case against President Ma in the district court. 70  After the 
                                                        
67 Lawrence Chung, Taiwan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng Expelled from KMT, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1308336/taiwan-speaker-wang-jin-pyng-
expelled-kmt. 
68 Id. at 2. 
69 Zuigao Fayuan [Sup. Ct.], Civil Ruling, 104 TAI-SHANG NO. 704 (2015) (Taiwan). The High Court 
holds that the process of dismissal did not satisfy the KMT’s internal rule. However, on appeal, the Supreme 
Court ruled for Mr. Wang in another procedural ground: the KMT did not assigned attorney in time as 
required by the Civil Procedure Act, so it rejected the appeal. Id. 
70  Ker Chien-Ming Suing Ma Ying-Jeou, Huang Shih-Ming on Ten Counts, TAIWAN NEWS (Oct. 3, 
2013), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2314203. 
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prosecutor in the case against President Ma appealed, the high court recently 
ruled in favor of Mr. Ker and sentenced President Ma to four months in jail.71  
To be sure, the macro mechanism of checks and balances in Taiwan is 
still in effect and, so far, none of the President’s actions have been held 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The checks-and-balances 
mechanisms such as the appointment power by the President, passive 
dissolution, non-confidence vote, or veto power against legislation, have not 
ceased to function during the Ma administration, but they also have not kicked 
in to tame the chief executive’s power to seize the other branches. Therefore, 
the problem is not within the macro design of the checks-and-balances 
mechanism, but in how the President uses his or her power.72 
To expand his or her power, the President may use the informal 
influence over key officers. For example, in 2006, Parliament revised the 
statute regarding the appointment process of the Attorney General, providing 
the President with the power to appoint the Attorney General subject to the 
consent of the Parliament with a fixed term of four years.73 This institutional 
design aims to secure the independence of the Attorney General, keeping him 
away from the chain of command under the Executive Yuan. However, the 
Attorney General in this case apparently regarded the President as his boss 
and, therefore, reported the scandal between the Speaker and the DPP’s whip 
to the President at the earliest possible chance. Institutionally speaking, the 
Attorney General should function like an independent agency but, 
strategically thinking, he would need support from political branches to avoid 
any backfire.  
The Legislative Yuan is a collective institution, which may not provide 
the steady support that the Attorney General is inclined to seek out. The 
President is the one who nominates the Attorney General and is in one of the 
most legitimate positions of power with the authority to distribute political 
resources to other political offices. Furthermore, the President enjoys the 
power to appoint the Premier who leads the whole government.74 Therefore, 
it is rational for the Attorney General to turn to the President before jumping 
                                                        
71  Taiwan Gaodeng Fayuan [High Ct.], Criminal Decision, 106 ZHU-SHANG-YI NO. 2 (2018) (Taiwan). 
72  Huang Cheng-Yi (黃丞儀), Zongtong de Zhengzhi Xingwei Bu Neng Shi Xianfa Weisuo Zhi Ling 
(總統的政治行為不能使憲法萎縮至零) [The President’s Political Actions Cannot Shrink the Constituion 
to Zero], 232 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI (台灣法學雜誌) 1, 1–2 (2013). 
73  Fayuan Zuzhifa [Court Organization Act], art. 66 (2006) (Taiwan). 
74  MINGUO XIANFA [Additional Articles of the Constitution], art. 3 (2005) (China), 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000002. 
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into troubled waters. As a result, the President may then cast influence over 
the decisions of the Attorney General, since he turns to the President for help. 
In this case, the relationship between the President and the Attorney General 
ran completely against the statutory function of the Attorney General as an 
independent agency. Meanwhile, the Premier was being informed by the 
President, further turning the parliamentary design, enshrined in the 
constitution, into a presidential system. The consequence was a President who 
sat at the government’s apex, and this was achieved without having to change 
a single word in the constitution or its amendments.   
The presidents are usually the ones who lead their parties to victory in 
an election and then, after the election, they continue to chair their parties. 
Although the constitution does not prohibit the President from concurrently 
serving as the Chairperson of the ruling party, the overlapped capacities 
effectuate the President’s immense power to control not only the executive, 
but also the legislative branch. Opponents of the unity of party leadership and 
presidency often argue that the fusion of presidential power and disciplinary 
power from the ruling party relinquishes the President from any form of 
checking mechanism. 75  However, in a parliamentary system, the prime 
minister must also serve as the ruling party’s leader. He or she is also the chair 
in the cabinet council. Therefore, the unity of party leadership and the 
executive power is common in the parliamentary system and would not be 
attacked as unconstitutional. The argument has also been made that presidents 
in a mixed system like Taiwan are not accountable to the legislative branch. 
He or she does not need to appear in the Legislative Yuan to defend the ruling 
party’s policy or legislation, like a prime minister in a parliamentary system. 
Neither does he or she have to give a speech such as the “State of the Union,” 
which is delivered by the U.S. president. Checks and balances between the 
president and the legislature do not seem to work in Taiwan’s mixed system. 
76 
                                                        
75  Su Yen-Tu (蘇彥圖 ), Liangzhong Jilüjian De Zha zheng: Yige Guanyu Taiwan Dangqian 
Dang/Guo Feji Zhengyi De Xushi Yu Pinglun (兩種紀律間的戰爭:一個關於台灣當前黨／國分際爭議的
敘事與評論) [Two Disciplinary Wars: A Narrative and Commentary on Taiwan's Current Party/Country 
Disputes], 232 TAIWAN FAXUE ZAZHI (台灣法學雜誌) 14, 17–18 (2013). 
76  However, the president is still subject to impeachment and presidential election every four years. 
MINGUO XIANFA [Additional Articles of the Constitution] art. 2, para. 4–5 (2005) (Taiwan) (“The terms of 
office for both the president and the vice president shall be four years. The president and the vice president 
may only be re- elected to serve one consecutive term; and the provisions of Article 47 of the Constitution 
shall not apply.” “Should a motion to impeach the president or the vice president initiated by the Legislative 
Yuan and presented to the grand justices of the Judicial Yuan for adjudication be upheld by the Constitutional 
Court, the impeached person shall forthwith be relieved of his duties.”). 
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In Interpretation No. 613 and 589, the court reiterated that the exercise 
of one power could not deprive the other power of its core function. However, 
in the aforementioned cases, whether the coordinative and decisional power 
affiliated with the president infringes upon the core function of other powers 
is not clearly evident, unless it has expressly violated the statutes. In this vein, 
the presidents actually enjoy unenumerated executive power and keenly 
exercise it as a control mechanism in Taiwan.   
B. Power to Call Intra-Branches Meetings  
Although the President is elected directly by the people, Taiwan’s 
constitution provides the President with very limited power. As previously 
mentioned, the 1947 Constitution adopted the parliamentary system. However, 
the first National Assembly passed Temporary Provisions in 1948 to bestow 
immense emergency power to the President, rather than to the Premier of the 
Executive Yuan, who is the head of the executive branch, according to the 
constitutional text.77 In 1960, the Temporary Provisions were further revised 
to allow President Chiang Kai-shek to be reelected without term limitation.  
In 1966 and 1972, the National Assembly twice revised the Temporary 
Provisions to delegate to the President the power to reorganize the government 
and to create new bureaus within the President’s office.78 Throughout the 
period of martial law, presidential power became overwhelmingly dominant 
and powerful. Some scholars even claim that the constitution’s parliamentary 
system was mostly destroyed during that authoritarian time.79  
After the lift of martial law in 1987, and the abolishment of Temporary 
Provisions in 1991, the Constitution went through a series of amendments, 
among which the adoption of a semi-presidential system in 1997 was the most 
significant. According to the 1997 Amendment, the President enjoys the 
power to appoint the Premier of the Executive Yuan without consent from 
members of the Legislative Yuan, i.e., the parliament.80 However, according 
to the constitution, the Premier is the one who shall be accountable to the 
parliament. He or she leads the cabinets to propose legislation, to submit 
                                                        
77  Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan [Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of 
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion] (promulgated by the Nat’l Assemb. Of 
the Republic of China, Apr. 18, 1949, effective May 10, 1948) art. 1 (1948) (China). 
78  Cheng-Yi Huang, Frozen Trials: Political Victims and Their Quest for Justice, in TAIWAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A STORY OF TRANSFORMATION (Jerome A. Cohen et al. eds., 2018).  
79   YEH, supra note 61, at 34–36. 
80  MINGUO XIANFA [Additional Articles of the Constitution], art. 3 (2005) (China). 
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budgets, and to debate major policies in the parliament. The constitutional 
court also holds that the Premier of the Executive Yuan is the head of 
administration, not the President.81  
This brings trouble to the President. Once he or she is elected, he or she 
has no vehicle to carry out his or her campaign promise. The President 
becomes a powerless person in the government, owing to the original design 
of parliamentary system. Though the 1997 Amendment claims to adopt a 
semi-presidential system, it does not provide the President with power to 
dissolve the parliament at will.82 He or she can only dissolve the parliament 
when the parliament passes a no-confidence vote on the Premier. In practice, 
there has never been a vote of no-confidence casted by the parliament; this is 
because parliament do not want to give the President any chance to dissolve 
the parliament. Hence, the President, if he or she strictly follows the 
constitution and its amendments, would not be able to participate in policy 
deliberation or communicate with members of the executive cabinet. Nor can 
the President remove the Premier after appointment.  
Such dilemmas are due to political compromises in the process of 
democratization, which have not been cured in the past two decades. 83 
However, since the first presidential election in 1996, each Taiwanese 
President has strived to consolidate his or her power not only from within, but 
also beyond the constitutional purview of the presidency. One salient 
evidentiary component of this is that all of the Presidents, from both the KMT 
or from the DPP, have engaged in the practice of setting up meetings with the 
Premier and cabinet members, sometimes even with parliamentary leaders 
and mayors of his or her own party. During these informal meetings, major 
policies are discussed and finalized. However, Article 58 of the Constitution 
provides no such power to the Presidents.84 It stipulates that all the bills, 
budgets, and major policies shall be presented and decided in the Executive 
Yuan Council, which consists of cabinet members. Meanwhile, the President 
                                                        
81  Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 613 (司法院大法官解釋第 613 號解釋 ) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 613] (July 21, 2006); Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 645 (司法院大法官解釋第 645號
解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 645] (July 11, 2008).    
82  YEH, supra note 61, at 65. 
83  Id. at 37–38.  
84  Xie Jun-Lin (謝君臨), Ma Ying-Jiu Xiemian Yi “Yuanji Tiaojiequan Kangbian” Xuezhe Dalian (馬
英九洩密案以「院際調解權」抗辯 學者打臉) [Ma Ying-jeou’s Leaked Case is Based on the Scholarly 
Defense of “Inter-agency Mediation Rights”], ZIYOU SHIBAO ( 自 由 時 報 ) (Mar. 31, 2018), 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/society/breakingnews/2382413. 
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is permitted by the Constitution to call a meeting among different Yuans (in 
this case, the Legislative Yuan and Executive Yuan) only when there is a 
dispute between two or more Yuans.85 Therefore, these meetings convened by 
the President are extra-constitutional by nature. Moreover, although there is 
very little mention about the presidential office in the Constitution, the 
President organizes advisory boards or meetings, which provides 
comprehensive policy suggestions or agenda items, such as the human rights 
consultative committee, indigenous historical justice committee, pension 
reform meeting, and judicial reform council. All these efforts are a direct 
response to the constitutional impotence of the presidency after the 1997 
Amendment. 86  
During President Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration (2008-2016), critics 
argued that his informal meetings with the Premier, the Speaker of the 
Legislative Yuan, and KMT party leaders in the presidential office were 
unconstitutional, due to lack of accountability to the parliament during the 
decision-making process for major policies decided at these meetings. For 
example, the continual construction of the No. 4 Nuclear Power Plant, the 
trade service pact with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the lifting 
of restrictions on Chinese investment were all presented, negotiated, and 
concluded during these informal meetings convened by the President, rather 
than during the Executive Yuan Council meetings. 87  Since the power to 
convene these meetings cannot be found in the Constitution, President Tsai 
Ing-wen, who is also the Chairperson of the DPP, invited the Premier, cabinet 
members and key legislators to dine at her residence so as to avoid criticism.88 
President Tsai asserted that she coordinated this event based on her capacity 
as the Chairperson of the ruling party. This rationale fuses the nature of the 
                                                        
85  MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] (1947) art. 44 (Taiwan) (“In case of disputes between two or 
more Yuan other than those concerning which there are relevant provisions in this Constitution, the President 
may call a meeting of the Presidents of the Yuan concerned for consultation with a view to reaching a 
solution.”). 
86  Xiang Chenghua (項程華) & Xie Guo-Zhang (謝國璋), Woguo Banzongtongzhi Zongtong Zhiquan 
Jieshi De Tantao-Xingzheng Zongtong Yu Zhongcai Zongtong Quanshi De Keneng (我國半總統制總統職
權解釋的探討－行政總統與仲裁總統詮釋的可能) [A Probe into the Interpretation of the Presidency of 
the Presidential System in China—The Possible Interpretation of the President and the Arbitration President], 
43 XIAN ZHENGSHI DAI (憲政時代) 181, 203–04 (2018). 
87 Zhāng Yòu Zōng (張佑宗), Zhāng Yòu Zōng Zhuān Lán Shì Mínzhǔ Zhìdù Quēxiàn Bùshì Zǒngtǒng 
Kèyì (張佑宗專欄：是民主制度缺陷  不是總統刻意) [Zhang Youzong Column: Is a Defect in the 
Democratic System, Not the President’s Deliberate], SHÀNG BÀO ( 上 報 ) (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=5967. 
88  Zhong Li-Hua (鍾麗華), Zhizheng Juece Xietiao Huiyi Hanka (執政決策協調會議 喊卡) [Ruling 
Decision Coordination Meeting], ZIYOU SHIBAO ( 自 由 時 報 ) (Apr. 10, 2017), 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1092931. 
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parliamentary system with the that of the presidency. The power to coordinate 
is now more entrenched and affiliated with the presidency than ever before, 
though it is still not enumerated in the constitution.  
As we have seen in the case of Taiwan, the unenumerated powers 
exercised by the Presidents are responses to institutional plights left by 
constitutional reform in the 1990s. The Presidents are elected by the whole 
nation but cannot directly lead the administration. To render her policies and 
overcome institutional hurdles, she has to use the party as a platform to 
coordinate with both the cabinet members and key legislators. However, if all 
the major decisions are decided behind the scenes during informal meetings, 
then the checks and balances mechanisms are simply bypassed. The twilight 
zone of party leadership enables the Presidents to be the boss of both the 
executive and the legislature, but it also creates a dilemma that Presidents feel 
both powerless and all-powerful.  
IV. THE TURBULENCE OVER LAW AND POLITICS: UNSEEN AND UNCHECKED 
POLITICAL LEADERS IN POLAND  
A. The Puppets’ Master: Party Leadership and Political 
Unaccountability 
It is well known that in a parliamentary system the majority party’s 
leader is the Prime Minister. However, this is not always the case in Poland. 
The Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość,  “PiS”) made this 
exception twice. In 2005, PiS won the elections and formed a coalition with 
the League of Polish Families party (Liga Polskich Rodzin, “LPR”) and the 
Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland party (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej 
Polskiej, “Samoobrona RP”).89 At that time, the leader of PiS was Jarosław 
Kaczyński, who took over as PiS’s chairman from his twin brother, Lech 
Kaczyński in 2003. Jarosław announced, however, that he would not serve as 
Prime Minister, so that it would not reduce the chances of Lech, who was 
running for the presidency in two weeks. It was Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz 
who was chosen and later appointed to the Prime Minister position. 90 
However, Mr. Marcinkiewicz resigned in 2006 so, this time, it was Jarosław 
Kaczyński, the party’s chairperson, who assumed the position of Prime 
Minister. Jarosław Kaczyński ran the government for about a year, until the 
                                                        
89  Radoslaw Markowski, The Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or a Restructuring of the Party 
System?, 29 WEST EUR. POL. 814, 830 (2006). 
90  Frances Millard, Poland's Politics and the Travails of Transition after 2001: The 2005 Elections, 
58 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1007, 1025 (2006). 
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coalition collapsed in 2007 and the Civic Platform party (Platforma 
Obywatelska, “PO”) took the office. Jarosław Kaczyński has remained as the 
leader of PiS since then.  
After two years of being in the opposition, PiS under Kaczyński's 
leadership won the election in 2015. This time there was no need to form a 
coalition in parliament.91 However, similar to what happened in 2005, despite 
being the leader of the majority party, Kaczyński decided not to take the office 
of Prime Minister. Instead, he chose Beata Szydło, a barely recognizable 
member of the party, to be the candidate for the position of Prime Minister 
during the campaign. Mrs. Szydło had just operated a successful presidential 
campaign for Andrzej Duda a few months earlier. Since people were afraid of 
strongmen like Kaczyński, PiS decided that having Beata Szydło as the 
candidate might help them to secure more ballots.92 Mrs. Szydło served as 
Prime Minister until December 2017. Her successor, Mr. Mateusz 
Morawiecki, is believed to have been handpicked by Jarosław Kaczyński as 
well.  
As a result of this political scenario, there is now a system of dual 
leadership in the Polish politics: officially, Prime Minister Szydło or 
Morawiecki leads the cabinet; however, as a matter of fact, Kaczyński has 
been leading the country through his party, PiS. Many have suggested that the 
final decision-making authority does not belong to the Prime Minister, but 
instead lies in the hands of Kaczyński.93 Ironically, Kaczyński now enjoys 
more powers than he had in 2005 even though he is just a member of 
                                                        
91  In fact, PiS shared its electoral list with minor parties: Poland Together (Polska Razem, led by the 
Minister of Science and Higher Education Jaroslaw Gowin) and Poland United (Solidarna Polska, led by the 
Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro) ran for the election as the candidates of Law and Justice (PiS). Even 
now, in the parliament, they are the members of the Parliamentary Club of Law and Justice. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, PiS did not enjoy a single-party majority. However, both minor parties were aligned with PiS, they 
shared similar ideologies with PiS and took actions in accordance with PiS’s agenda. See Ben Stanley, 
Populism in Poland, in POPULISM AROUND THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 67, 78 (Daniel 
Stockemer ed., 2018). 
92  On a party conference, Kaczyński asked PiS to put Szydło’s candidacy forward for the prime 
minister, because “the [presidential] election showed that Poles are expecting new faces and expecting a 
generational change.” Pawel Sobczak & Wiktor Szary, Poland's Kaczynski Names Deputy Party Leader as 
Potential PM, REUTERS (June 20, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-election-PiS-
idUSKBN0P00DZ20150620. 
93  According to an article by Jan Cienski of Politico, an anonymous close political ally revealed that 
there’s a line of ministers and deputy prime ministers waiting to see Kaczyński who listens to them all and 
in the end he makes a decision and those decisions are final. See Jan Cienski, Poland’s ‘Powerholic’, 
POLITICO (July 11, 2016), https://www.politico.eu/article/polands-powerholic-jaroslaw-kaczynski-warsaw-
law-and-justice-party-pis/. 
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parliament now.94 As the leader of the majority party he also has the power to 
give advice on public policy and to set up the political agenda. However, what 
he has done goes beyond advice and coordination—he substantially rules the 
country without any checks. Whatever Kaczyński says transforms into the 
government’s decisions. For example, Kaczyński once mentioned that Poland 
should not let the incumbent President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, 
who also served as prime minister of Poland from 2007 to 2014, be re-elected 
to the office. After repeating his remarks fiercely, Prime Minister Szydło 
stated that the Polish government would not vote for Tusk in 2017 and would 
propose its own candidate.95  
Another example is that, after a big controversy regarding the 
Amendment on Environmental Protection Law, Kaczyński declared that the 
amendment must be rewritten, at least partially. A couple of days later, the 
government proposed changes to the bill. It was also openly known that the 
ministers, the Prime Minister, and the President met with Kaczyński regularly, 
though not in the Chancellery Building of the Prime Minister, but at 
Nowogrodzka street in Warsaw, where the main building of the party is 
located.96 It is common understanding among the Polish people that almost 
every important decision of the executive power has gone through the 
machinery of Kaczyński.97 
Although there is no hard evidence, one thing is clear: Kaczyński is the 
most powerful politician in Poland nowadays. He dictates the direction of the 
Prime Minister (and, through him or her, controls the cabinet and the 
government), and he leads the majority party, and he even has critical 
influence over the President of the Republic.98 So, as the leader of his party, 
                                                        
94  An interesting fact: as he is the leader of the Law and Justice party, he is also being called “Prezes 
Kaczyński,” not “MP Kaczyński.” While in Polish, “prezes” and “prezydent” are two different words, the 
English translation of these two words is the same: “president.” So, Jarosław Kaczyński is being called the 
“president,” despite being just a regular MP. With the passiveness of the President of Poland and the Prime 
Minister, this word underlies the wicked position that Kaczyński holds in Poland right now.   
95  Warsaw Formally Ditches Support for Tusk EU Candidacy, DW (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.dw.com/en/warsaw-formally-ditches-support-for-tusk-eu-candidacy/a-37811620.  This ended 
in a big diplomatic fiasco with the twenty-seven EU countries voting for Donald Tusk and Poland being both 
the homeland of Tusk and the only country against him. Donald Tusk Re-Elected as European Council 
President Despite Poland's Objections, DW (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/donald-tusk-re-elected-
as-european-council-president-despite-polands-objections/a-37874185. 
96  Cienski, supra note 93. 
97  Id. 
98  President Andrzej Duda has tried some public-relation activities to show that he is independent from 
the PiS. For example, since 2017, Duda has initiated a constitutional referendum and proposed to hold a 
referendum on November 10 and 11, 2018, on the latter Poland marks its centenary of independence. 
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he has the final say on important policies, which would later be effectuated by 
the government and parliamentary majority with the President’s signature. If 
he were the Prime Minister, Kaczyński’s actions would be held accountable 
politically. If there were at least forty-six members of the Sejm (i.e., the 
parliament) to file a motion of censure against the whole Council of Ministers, 
PiS would have to propose a new candidate for the Prime Minister. 99 
Meanwhile, were there at least sixty-nine members of the Sejm to file a motion 
of censure against the particular minister, PiS would have to appoint a new 
one.100 However, since Kaczyński is neither the Prime Minister nor a minister, 
there is no way to counterbalance his power. On top of his politically 
unchecked power, literally speaking, Kaczyński may change the prime 
minister at will. The only branch that was still independent from his control is 
the judiciary, especially the constitutional court. Therefore, immediately after 
PiS came to the power, they turned to the Constitutional Tribunal and tried to 
get control over the National Council of Judiciary.101 
                                                        
However, this proposal was rejected by Senate in July 2018. See Senators Reject Polish President’s Push for 
Constitution Referendum, RADIO POLAND (July 25, 2018), 
http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/374792,Senators-reject-Polish-president’s-push-for-constitution-
referendum. Those fifteen proposed constitutional referendum questions are still available on the official 
website of the President of the Republic of Poland. The Proposed Constitutional Referendum Questions, 
PRESIDENT PL. (June 12, 2018). Additionally, in July 2017, Duda unexpectedly vetoed the controversial bills 
on judicial reforms which ignited huge protests on the streets and critics say it would give PiS power to 
choose judges. See Polish President Andrzej Duda to Veto Judicial Jeforms, DW (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.dw.com/en/polish-president-andrzej-duda-to-veto-judicial-reforms/a-39811692. See Wojciech 
Sadurski, Judicial “Reform” in Poland: The President’s Bills are as Unconstitutional as the Ones he Vetoed, 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2007), https://verfassungsblog.de/judicial-reform-in-poland-the-presidents-
bills-are-as-unconstitutional-as-the-ones-he-vetoed/. 
99  Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Ogloszono W. Dz. U. 1997 nr 78 poz 483, Rozdzial VI 
[Constitution] art. 158 para. 1 (1997) (Poland), http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm 
(“The Sejm shall pass a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers by a majority of votes of the 
statutory number of Deputies, on a motion moved by at least 46 Deputies and which shall specify the name 
of a candidate for Prime Minister. If such a resolution has been passed by the Sejm, the President of the 
Republic shall accept the resignation of the Council of Ministers and appoint a new Prime Minister as chosen 
by the Sejm, and, on his application, the other members of the Council of Ministers and accept their oath of 
office.”). Poland does not have the impeachment process like other countries do, but a slightly similar 
procedure provided in Article 198 and relevant provisions offers the basis of the responsibility to be discussed 
in the State Tribunal for infringement upon the Constitution.  
100  Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej ogloszono W. Dz. U. 1997, nr 78 poz 483, Rozdzial 
VI [Constitution] art. 159, para. 1 (1997) (Poland), http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm 
(“The Sejm may pass a vote of no confidence on an individual minister. A motion for the vote of no 
confidence has to be submitted by at least sixty-nine deputies. The provisions of Article 158, para. 2 shall 
apply as appropriate.”).  
101  MALGORZATA SZULEKA ET AL., HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRISIS IN POLAND 2015 – 2016 (Joanna Smetek trans., 2016), https://www.hfhr.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/HFHR_The-constitutional-crisis-in-Poland-2015-2016.pdf. 
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B. Falandization: President’s Power to Interpret the Law 
There are a couple of presidential actions in Poland teetering upon the 
borderline of his constitutional powers. For example, as the prelude to the 
constitutional showdown of court-packing in 2015, President Andrzej Duda 
refused to swear in three justices to the Constitutional Tribunal whom were 
appointed by the Civic Platform government. In an interview with the Polish 
Radio in November 2015, the President described the elections of 
Constitutional Tribunal judges by the previous Sejm as “a gross violation of 
democratic principles and the stability of a democratic state based on the rule 
of law.”102 However, there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing any 
interpretative power to the President so as to reject constitutional judges 
whose appointment have been passed by the Sejm. When presidential 
interpretation of the Constitution or a statute go too far, the Polish people use 
a term, falandization of law (falandyzacja prawa), to describe the presidential 
manipulation of legal interpretation to achieve his political purposes.103   
Falandization was coined after the strategic interpretations offered by 
Lech Falandysz, the major legal advisor to Lech Wałęsa, the first president in 
Poland after 1989.  President Wałęsa was in office during 1990 and 1995. 
During his term, his popular support, as well as political coalition, diminished 
quickly. To consolidate his own power, he relied heavily on strategic 
interpretations offered by Minister Falandysz who believed that, during the 
early stages of democratization, the President should expand the scope of his 
power by informal action, like legal interpretation.104 In a well-known case 
over the abonnement two appointments to the National Broadcasting Council 
(Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT, “NBC”), Mr. Falandysz argued 
that the President enjoyed the power to withdraw his appointments, since he 
                                                        
102  Id. at 19; see also Prezydent Andrzej Duda: niepodległość jest zobowiązaniem dla wszystkich 
Polaków [President Andrzej Duda: Independence is a Commitment for All Poles], POLSKIE RADIO SA (Nov. 
11, 2015), https://www.polskieradio.pl/7/129/Artykul/1543232,Prezydent-Andrzej-Duda-niepodleglosc-
jest-zobowiazaniem-dla-wszystkich-Polakow; Christian Davies, Poland is ‘On Road to Autocracy’, Says 
Constitutional Court President, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/18/poland-is-on-road-to-autocracy-says-high-court-president.  
103  According to Wiktor Osiatynski, “to falandize means to stretch the law beyond its intentions and 
limits in order to foster the interests and power of an institution.” See Wiktor Osiatynski, The Constitutional 
Honeymoon Is Over: The Paradoxes of Post-Communist Constitution Making, in THE PARADOXES OF 
UNINTENTIONAL CONSEQUENCES 143–63 (Lord Dahrendorf et al. eds., 2001). See also ARTUR OLECHNO, 
ABUSE OF LAW BY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE HEADS OF STATES (U. of Bialystok), 
https://is.muni.cz/do/law/1237864/web/principles/pdf/olechno.pdf. 
104   WOJCIECH ROSZKOWSKI & JAN KOFMAN, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 2833 (Wojciech Roszkowski & Jan Kofman eds., 2008).   
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had the power to appoint.105 Nevertheless, there is no constitutional provision 
granting him the power to dismiss the board members of NBC. Falandysz 
argued that, if the language of the Constitution is silent, President Wałęsa may 
interpret the Constitution to fulfill his constitutional duty. 
The case of NBC was fiercely debated in Poland. Ultimately, the 
Constitutional Tribunal reached its conclusion in the following ruling:  
According to the Constitutional Tribunal, when the norms are 
vague and unclear about competence (/authority), the 
constitutional principle of legitimacy along with the principle of 
democratic state of law have explicitly indicated that the 
competence (/authority) cannot be alleged or made up, if the 
legislators did not express their intention clearly. . . . In reference 
to the non-expressed competences, the statute must always be 
interpreted based on the text, and no other ways of interpretation 
is permitted.106 
This decision of the Constitutional Tribunal set up the final standard of 
interpreting competence norms. In fact, the conflict between the President and 
the Sejm was the deciding factor in this ruling. Wałęsa was in office until 1995, 
two years before the enactment of the current Constitution. Therefore, his 
presidency looked very different from the ones of his successors. First, the 
power of the President flowed from the amended Constitution of People’s 
Republic of Poland of 1952,107 and then from the so-called Small Constitution 
of 1992. 108  Both documents provided an institutional design for the 
President’s role, which was very different from the previously existing one. 
The power of the President was much broader, though not a typical 
presidential system. The post-1989 Sejm was very outspoken and became the 
voice of the nation. This competition led to many conflicts between the 
President and the Sejm, or even the whole government. President Lech Wałęsa, 
therefore, had strong incentives to strengthen his presidential power.  
                                                        
105  RAY TARAS, POSTCOMMUNIST PRESIDENTS 151 (1997).  
106  Case no. W 7/94, Wyrok TK, W 7/94 of the Constitutional Court (Oct. 5. 1994). 
107  One of the two amendments of 1989 actually replaced the name “People’s Republic of Poland” with 
“Republic of Poland” in the constitution.  
108 See generally Mała Konstytucja z 1992 [The Constitutional Act of October 17, 1992] (discussing 
the Mutual Relations Between Legislative and Executive of the Republic of Poland, and the local self-
government), translated in http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/pl02000_.html. 
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Drawing from the experience of Lech Wałęsa’s overreaching power 
and his constant conflicts with the Sejm, the drafters of the 1997 Constitution 
decided to significantly limit the power of the President and to adopt the 
parliamentary system, saying goodbye to the semi-presidential system. 109 
Unfortunately, this did not mean that falandization disappeared. In fact, it 
appears to be endemic. During the PiS administration, Prime Minister Szydło 
decided not to promulgate the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal, even 
though there was no statute authorizing her the power to withhold the 
publication of constitutional judgment.110 
The trickiest logic about falandization is that it is not something 
expressly prohibited by the law, but that it is also not something that is 
permitted by the law. As such, it always justified the President’s action as 
being “not literally forbidden by law expressly.” One recent example of 
falandization by the President is the extremely controversial change in the Act 
Regarding the Institute of the National Remembrance. The bill caused 
tensions between Polish-Israeli and Polish-American relations. The President 
had three options: he could have either signed the bill into law, referred it to 
the Constitutional Tribunal (so-called “preventive control”), or returned it 
to the Sejm. Surprisingly, he decided to sign the bill and send it to the 
Constitutional Tribunal.111 This is a very confusing presidential action. On the 
one hand, if the President has any doubt concerning the bill, he may refuse to 
sign on it and simply send it to the Constitutional Tribunal. He cannot have it 
both ways. By signing the bill, the President affirmed that the bill was 
consistent with the Constitution. However, signing the bill and immediately 
sending it to the Constitutional Tribunal created a dubious decision on the 
constitutionality of the regarding law, which might have violated his 
fundamental duty as the guardian of the Constitution. 112  There was no 
constitutional provision or statute that prohibited such a presidential action, 
though many lawyers in Poland were convinced that the President had twisted 
his duty too much.  
 
                                                        
109  Jerzy J. Wiatr, President in the Polish Democracy, POLITICKA MISAO (Jan. 24, 2018), 
hrcak.srce.hr/file/42351. 
110  Davies, supra note 102.   
111  The Office of President, Statement by the President of the Republic of Poland on the Amendment of 
the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance, PRESIDENT.PL (Feb. 6, 2018), 
http://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/art,669,president-decides-to-sign-anti-defamation-bill. 
112 Unfortunately, the very similar situation also took place during the tenure of Bronislaw Komorowski, 
the premier during Civic Platform administration.  
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V. PLENARY POWER OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
Having illustrated the different types of unenumerated executive 
powers with three case-studies, we will now discuss the nature and pathology 
of the global phenomenon in this section. The first and foremost issue we have 
to distinguish is whether or not the unenumerated powers are constitutional 
power. If they are not, there is no need to discuss any normative implication 
of this type of power. Then, the exercise of unenumerated powers would be a 
question of de facto power, which might or might not violate the basic 
requirements of constitutionalism. If they are constitutional, what is the 
difference between unenumerated powers and enumerated ones? Is it the 
cause of democratic failure? Let us start with the nature of unenumerated 
powers. As shown in the three cases, all the “powers” exercised by the 
presidents or prime ministers are not clearly defined in their constitutions. 
However, are those powers unconstitutional? American constitutional debates 
over the scope of Article II power provide some clues to navigate this thorny 
question. Louis Fisher, one of the authorities of separation of powers in the 
United States, argues that all three powers in the American Constitution have 
implied powers, which are “powers that can be reasonably drawn from express 
powers.”113 He argues that the removal power, for example, which is not listed 
in Article II, can be construed from the Take Care clause of Article II. 
Therefore, it is hard to argue that powers that are implied and unenumerated 
in the Constitution are unconstitutional. Nevertheless, even though he 
supports the idea of implied powers, Fisher opposes the notion of inherent 
powers (or the sole-organ doctrine) articulated by Justice Sutherland in his 
opinion for Curtiss-Wright. 114  According to Justice Sutherland, in the 
domestic context, powers that have not been written in the Constitution are 
left for local states, so there is no implied power reserved for the federal 
government.115 However, in the realm of international relations, the President 
enjoys sole and independent power, which does not require legislative 
delegation, since the sovereignty shall be one on the external issues.116 This is 
                                                        
113  LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1 (2014).  
114  United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
115  “[T]hose specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and 
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal 
affairs . . . .” Id. at 316. 
116  “It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the 
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations––a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress but which, of course, 
like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the 
Constitution.” Id. at 319–20.  
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the inherent power of the President, which enables him or her to gain 
preemptive power in the realm of foreign affairs. Fisher criticizes the idea of 
“inherent power” on the grounds that it would grant presidents immense 
power without any sensible limitation. However, “implied powers,” according 
to him, have to be affiliated with discernible constitutional authority of the 
President listed in the Constitution.   
The contrast between domestic and international issues has become less 
and less apparent. For example, the president may take unilateral actions, like 
memoranda or executive orders, to implement environmental, anti-terrorism, 
or immigration policies, which substantially impact foreign affairs. Therefore, 
it is implausible to argue that the president enjoys inherent powers in the 
terrain of international relations but not in the domestic context. Modern 
American presidents have frequently relied upon their inherent powers to 
make domestic policies.117 One prominent example is President Truman’s 
executive order to seize the nation’s steel industry in the wake of Korean 
War.118 However, according to Louis Fisher, President Truman appealed to 
both enumerated and implied powers, rather than his inherent powers, in his 
order to seize the steel industry.119  
One should not be puzzled by this scholarly taxonomy. To make the 
comparison clearer, the inherent power defined by Louis Fisher is very similar 
to William Blackstone’s definition of the King’s prerogative as “those rights 
and capacities which the king enjoys alone.” 120In the modern context, Fisher 
further distinguished inherent power from the prerogative power. According 
to him, “[u]nder inherent power, the President claims authority to act 
independently without any interference from the other branches,” while 
“[p]rerogative accepts that the executive may take the initiative, but only with 
the understanding that the legislative branch must act later.”121 By “inherent 
power,” Fisher means the powers directly derived from the position of the 
chief executive. Those powers that can find textual (enumerated) or 
intentional (implied) basis in the constitution would not be regarded as 
                                                        
117  See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Sairishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
118  However, President Truman announced in his letters to the House and the Senate inviting legislative 
cooperation. Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233, 
243–44 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
119  See FISHER supra note 113, at 69.  
120  WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 232 (1765).  
121  See FISHER supra note 1133, at 73. 
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inherent powers. To Fisher, the assertion of inherent powers leads to the abuse 
of powers, since it essentially gives a blank check to the presidents.122  
This article has highlighted some actions of chief executives in Japan, 
Poland, and Taiwan as an exercise of “unenumerated powers,” rather than 
implied or inherent powers. Unenumerated powers are not clearly defined in 
the constitutions but are directly or indirectly pertinent to the constitutional 
authority of the chief executive, which is clearly defined in the constitution. 
In this sense, my use of unenumerated powers is very close to Fisher’s implied 
power. For example, the personnel power in Japan does not belong to the 
Prime Minister but to the cabinet.123 However, according to Article 68, the 
Prime Minister has the power to appoint the Ministers of State. The Prime 
Minister controls members of the cabinet and, therefore, may extend his 
power through the Cabinet’s Personnel Office to control the mid-level 
bureaucrats in the government. Similarly, the President in Taiwan enjoys 
constitutional power to coordinate different branches on controversial issues. 
Therefore, President Ma claimed that he was legally permitted to listen to the 
report from the Attorney General and to command him to investigate the case 
of the Speaker’s scandal. In this sense, he placed the Attorney General under 
his control and cemented the foundation of his unitary executive power. For 
Poland, when President Wałęsa decided to withdraw his appointments to the 
NBC, he twisted the language of the Small Constitution to expand his own 
power. But the “withdrawal” was justified by the Polish President’s power to 
appoint, even though the language of the Small Constitution did not mention 
“withdrawal.” These are clearly the implied powers enjoyed by the chief 
executives to expand their original authority.  
To makes things more complicated, murkier issues—like the cases of 
Mr. Abe’s special advisor, i.e., the shadow warrior in Japan, and Mr. 
Kaczyński, the puppet controller in Poland—are even more difficult to 
characterize and regulate under the formal model of separation of powers. 
                                                        
122  “A constitution safeguards individual rights and liberties by specifying and limiting government. 
Express and implied powers serve that purpose. Inherent powers invite claims of power that have no limits, 
other than those voluntarily accepted by the President. What ‘inheres’ in the President? The word ‘inherent’ 
is sometimes cross-referenced to ‘intrinsic,’ which can be something ‘belonging to the essential nature or 
construction of a thing.’ What is in the ‘nature’ of a political office? Nebulous words and concepts invite 
political abuse and unconstitutional actions. They threaten individual liberties. Presidents who asset inherent 
powers move the nation from one of limited powers to boundless and ill-defined authority, undermining 
republican government, the doctrine of separation of powers, and the system of checks and balance.” See 
FISHER supra note 1133, at 70. 
123  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [Constitution], art. 73. (Japan) (“The Cabinet, in addition to other 
general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions: Administer the law faithfully; . . . 
Administer the civil service, in accordance with standards established by law[.]”) 
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They are exercising political powers but are not held accountable by any 
constitutional mechanism. These powers are coupled with constitutional 
authority of the “master” (in Japan) or the “puppets” (in Poland). Theolitical 
party becomes the channel to negotiate the two powers, constitutional and 
political, and to fuse the two powers into one. For example, Mr. Ma of Taiwan 
used his party leadership to remove Speaker Wang’s membership so that he 
would be disqualified as a member of the parliament. The political powers 
facilitate or support the expanding constitutional authority of the chief 
executive, so it is hard to draw a line between political power and 
constitutional power after the fusion of presidential powers.  
After examining the cases of non-statutory executive powers in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, Margit Cohn cogently argues, 
“the incompleteness of law, supplemented by the political expediency of 
reliance on non-statutory rules—especially when the executive is challenged 
by a relatively hostile legislature—virtually guarantees their use.”124 It is the 
vagueness and indeterminacy in statutes or constitutional provisions that gives 
the chief executives opportunities to reinterpret the language of the 
constitution and to expand the scope of unenumerated powers. Falandization 
is one example; there are many cases of unilateral executive action involved 
with interpretation. Once the chief executives find a loophole in the 
constitutional text, they may grasp the chance to generate “unenumerated” 
powers. Once there is one unenumerated power, there probably will be a 
second, third, and many unenumerated powers created by the presidents. This 
demonstrates the so- called “concept creep,” which makes the boundary of 
concept, e.g., the personnel power, blurry and fuzzy.125 By way of creeping, 
the chief executive not only expands his or her “unenumerated” powers, but 
also makes the executive the prime player in the constitutional arena. To avoid 
a constitutional crisis, constitutional systems around the globe should pay 
close attention to the gradual epidemic engendered by the creep of 
unenumerated powers.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Unenumerated powers are flexible and probably impossible to 
encompass under a fixed, singular, or operational definition. Moreover, they 
                                                        
124  Margit Cohn, Non-Statutory Executive Powers: Assessing Global Constitutionalism in a Structural-
Institutional Context, 64 INT’L & COMPARATIVE L.Q. 65, 101 (2015). 
125  Cass R. Sunstein, The Power of the Normal (Aug. 21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239204).   
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are coupled with political control or party discipline, which is not the 
traditional focus of the constitution. In this article, I attempt to delineate the 
metamorphosis of informal powers enjoyed by the chief executive and 
describe it as unenumerated powers. I argue that there are powers, either 
political or constitutional, pertinent to the chief executive’s constitutional 
authority that are not clearly and expressly defined in the constitution. The 
exercise of unenumerated powers is not so vicious, but how to hold them 
accountable is the key question. Legal scholars need to know more about the 
intersection of political powers and constitutional authority.   
The chief executives need unenumerated powers to facilitate their 
decision-making power. Especially in the age of the administrative state, 
national leaders have to satisfy all kinds of practical needs for the populace. 
Institutionally speaking, it is the court that should confine the scope of 
unenumerated powers. However, owing to the dichotomy of politics and law, 
courts are very rarely willing to deal with the pathology of unenumerated 
powers. Therefore, the politician’s immediate goal after winning the elections 
is to tame the judiciary or the branch in charge of constitutional interpretation, 
like the Legislation Bureau in Japan or the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland. 
This article argues that, once the chief executive gains the primary authority 
in interpreting the constitution or statutes with constitutional nature, the 
process of “concept creep” would help the chief executives to expand their 
constitutional authority and turn the country into a state of executive primacy. 
This is the epidemic plagued which plagues twenty-first century 
constitutionalism and may dangerously lead to the resurgence of 
authoritarianism.  
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